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“Best Interests of the Child”
by Andrew Schepard

Parents are essential to raising children. They love them,
make major decisions for them, provide a roof over their
heads. They offer emotional, educational, and economic
support. In “intact” families, parents make decisions for their
children jointly. There is no issue about where a child lives
because parents live together with the child in the same place.
However, many families in Virginia and the throughout the United States
do not remain “intact” — the parents separate or divorce and live apart.
Or increasingly, the parents choose not to marry and may or may not live
together when the child is born. When separating and divorcing parents
cannot agree on who should make decisions for their child (e.g., medical
care, religion, or schooling), where the child should live, or how much
one parent should see the child, they are in dispute over what the legal
system has historically called “custody” of a child.
The core method by which a court resolves the parents’ dispute is
through a traditional litigation model. The disputing parents bring their
disagreement to a judge who hears evidence and makes a decision about
what the child’s post separation and divorce custody arrangements
should be.
In every state, the overarching principle that the judge uses to evaluate
the parent’s competing claims is the “best interests of the child.” This
essay is designed to provide a brief introduction to that concept, a place
for the reader to begin to formulate his or her own ideas about the
usefulness and meaning of the “best interests of the child” standard.

The “best interests” test as a moral imperative and
social necessity
In Virginia, the court takes the following factors into consideration when
determining the best interests of the child for custody and visitation:
1. The age and physical and mental condition of the child, giving due
consideration to the child’s changing developmental needs;
2. The age and physical and mental condition of each parent;
3. The relationship existing between each parent and each child,
giving due consideration to the positive involvement with the
child’s life and the ability to accurately assess and meet the
emotional, intellectual and physical needs of the child;
4. The needs of the child, giving due consideration to other important
relationships of the child, including but not limited to siblings,
peers, and extended family members;
5. The role that each parent has played and will play in the future in
the upbringing and care of the child;
6. The propensity of each parent to actively support the child’s contact
and relationship with the other parent, including whether a parent
has unreasonably denied the other parent access to or visitation
with the child;
7. The relative willingness and demonstrated ability of each parent to
maintain a close and continuing relationship with the child, and
the ability of each parent to cooperate in and resolve disputes
regarding matters affecting the child;
8. The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child
to be of reasonable intelligence, understanding, age, and
experience to express such a preference;

9. Any history of family abuse or sexual abuse. If the court finds such
a history, the court may disregard the factors in subdivision 6; and
10.
Such other factors as the court deems necessary and proper to
the determination. (Code of Virginia, §20-124.3)
This is typical of many state statutes that list the factors that go into a
best interests determination. The factors seem sensible and thoughtful,
but are so general that it is difficult for parents (and indeed other judges)
to predict how they will be applied to a particular family.
For example, assume that the court has before it two reasonably fit,
loving parents. Both have been involved in parenting the child, albeit
with different divisions of time and labor as the now 12-year-old child
grew. Neither parent has any obvious parenting deficits — abuse and
neglect, violence towards the other spouse, drug or alcohol abuse, or a
diagnosable mental illness that affects parenting. The child loves both
parents and wants them to stay together. The parents, however, have
grown apart. Perhaps they had affairs or argued constantly with each
other. They want a divorce. But they cannot agree on who should make
decisions for the child, with which parent the child should live, and how
often the other parent should see the child.

The court has to decide — it cannot leave a child in
limbo caught between warring parents.
However, the determination that the court is being asked to make is
different than other decisions that a court typically makes. Most
judgments require the court to reconstruct past events through the
evidence presented and allocate civil or criminal responsibility — who
ran the red light causing the accident and was that negligence? Was the
criminal defendant mentally competent when committing the crime?
In a child custody determination, however, the court has to a make a
prediction of what parenting arrangement would benefit a child in the

future based on the evidence before it. Past events are a guide to future
parent-child relationships, but do not predetermine them. A parent who
stayed home with a child, for example, may have to go back to work after
separation and divorce because of financial need and a desire for
personal fulfillment. Several years after divorce, a teenage child may
blossom as a soccer player because of one parent’s coaching and
involvement, something that was not evident at the time of the custody
determination. One parent may relocate to a community that a child may
love or hate.
In short, a judicial “best interests” custody determination is, in effect, an
educated prediction about how parents and children will evolve, not
simply a reconstruction and legal interpretation of past events.
Unfortunately, there is scant evidence that anyone — including judges
and psychologists — is very good at making such a prediction of the
future. While available social science data creates a general framework
about what parenting arrangements would be good for children after
separation and divorce (e.g., they need “stability of relationships” in a
time of uncertainty and stress), the data cannot always create an accurate
prediction/decision for every particular child.
Further, the hostility, expense, trauma, and uncertainty for parents and
children required for the presentation of evidence to the court to make a
custody determination can make everything worse. The parents air
accusations and counter accusations about family life. Each will have to
pay a lawyer at a time when family finances are under great stress
already because of the need to support two households. The court may
order an expensive and intrusive mental health report to help it make a
decision. The child may be interviewed or called to testify.

However, the “best interests” test remains the overarching standard for
making child custody determinations. It is fundamentally a moral
statement; recognizing our responsibility to try to “do right” by children
through an orderly and rational process when parents separate or
divorce. The best-interests standard keeps everyone’s focus on the duty
to protect the weakest, most vulnerable actor in the separation or divorce
process. Generally children do not have a voice when their parents
separate or divorce yet they are the ones most put at risk by the adult
decision foisted on them.

The governing legal standard should remind parents
of their responsibility — while marriages and
relationships may dissolve, parents are forever.
In addition, society has a powerful practical reason to try to structure
post-separation and divorce parenting arrangements by reference to the
child’s best interests. The millions of children raised by separating and
divorcing parents are future parents, taxpayers, and citizens. Parental
separation and divorce can put them at emotional, educational, and
economic risk. While social science cannot provide data that will
accurately determine what parenting arrangements are best for an
individual child, it can tell us something about arrangements are likely to
benefit children. In most cases this includes:






assuring their safety
removing them from conflict
providing emotional stability and adequate parenting
having a meaningful relationship with both parents
receiving adequate economic support

The best interests of the child standard codifies these requirements and
provides guidance to judges who are asked to make critical
determinations about a child’s future

What does the “best interests of the child” standard
mean?
As discussed above, the “best-interests” test is the overarching guide for
policy and practice to determine a child’s post-separation and divorce
parenting arrangements. There simply is no ethical, moral, or legal
competitor. No one would, for example, seriously argue that a court
should determine custody according to the best interests of a parent or of
the state.
Agreeing on the overarching principle that a child’s best interests should
be determinative, however, does not help us determine what those best
interests are in a particular case. We live in a pluralistic, democratic
society where different judges can attach different meanings to that
phrase, even if there is a list of the factors that go into it, as in Virginia.

Essentially, the “best interests” test is at best an
aspirational statement;
it is what society hopes the outcome of a child custody dispute will be
rather than a proscription for a particular type of custody arrangement in
a particular family. The very high level of generality at which it is stated
leaves a great deal of discretion to judges implementing it. The way that
discretion is exercised has altered over time, influenced by changing
views of gender, economic power, and, more recently, social science.
THE ERAS OF GENDER BIAS

Until the latter half of the 20th century, judicial definition of a child’s
best interests was largely gender based. Historically, in England and in
the early years of the United States, fathers received custody as children

were seen as the property of the father. This rule made economic sense,
as men had access to resources to support the child that women
generally did not have. Mothers were, in broad terms, the property of
their husbands and did not have an independent economic existence.
By the end of the 19th century, the gender bias flipped. At this time,
courts developed and applied the “tender years” doctrine. Simply put, the
doctrine meant that courts presumed that the mother was the more
appropriate custodial parent for young children. Court decisions of the
time referenced the transcendental importance of mother love,
something seen as more important than the father’s affection for and
involvement with the child.
This judicial switch from father to mother reflects the influence of
contemporary thought on the importance of the mother-child bond in
the child’s emotional development. It also reflects the realities of the
increasing industrialization and division of labor within the family. Even
then some gender bias in favor of father continued during the tender
years era. Fathers typically had superior economic resources, so boys of
teenage years could be placed with the father largely because he had the
ability to support the adolescent child and prepare him for an
occupation.
Fast forward to the middle of the 20th century. The tender years doctrine
was challenged by the massive entry of women into the work place. The
influence of the campaign to eradicate gender bias against women in the
workplace had the opposite effect in custody disputes. If mothers could
not be denied access to jobs and economic opportunity on the basis of
gender, fathers could not be denied custody on the same basis. Many
states and courts began to move away from the tender years doctrine and

toward a more gender-neutral decision process for custody and
visitation.
THE MENTAL HEALTH COMMUNITY ENTERS THE PICTURE — THE ERA OF ONE

The end of gender-based presumptions unmoored custody
determinations from their anchors of certainty and predictability. Enter
a new conception of the “best interests” standard, this one heavily
influenced by mental health concepts.
By the last third of the 20th century, courts moved away from a
presumption in favor of mother custody to a psychological and emotional
“best interests of the child” standard. This movement also began a
systematic involvement of mental health practitioners and the social
sciences into child custody disputes, which continues to this day.
Originally published in 1973, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit’s Beyond the
Best Interests of the Child was the first highly influential attempt by a
law professor and two psychiatrists to integrate mental health concepts
into the best interests test. Based on case studies from foster care and
their own clinical experience, the authors postulated that the child’s most
important emotional need after divorce and separation was
psychological stability and preservation of key emotional relationships.
They advocated that the court identify the child’s single “psychological
parent” and give that parent all custody rights. To the authors, the child’s
need for stability was so important that they advocated that the
psychological parent should have the power to deny the other parent
visitation with the child. While most courts did not take this reasoning
that far, the book was heavily discussed and cited in the courts, and
within the law and mental health communities.

The evolution of the “best interests” standard,
however, shows some of the pitfalls of trying to base
legal standards on mental health concepts.
For example, while the concepts in Beyond the Best Interest of the
Child were ostensibly gender neutral, the author’s emphasis on the need
for a court to identify a single psychological parent meant that mothers,
who in the early 1970s were less likely to work outside the home,
received custody more often than fathers. Gender bias thus crept back
into the best interests standard under a more neutral label than the
discredited tender years doctrine.
Later research also revealed that Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit went too
far in stating that a child’s best interests after separation and divorce
were served by a stable relationship with a single psychological parent. A
strong research base established that fathers played both a significant
and complementary role in the development of children. Other studies
established that one of the best predictors of how well a child could
surmount the challenges of separation and divorce is strong relationship
with both parents, not just one.
JOINT CUSTODY — THE ERA OF TWO

Based on this research, many states, including Virginia, included the
possibility of joint custody — where parents shared parenting on an
equal footing rather than allocating primary power to one parent over
the other — as a possible outcome in custody cases. Some states enacted
a presumption that parents should share legal custody (decision making)
after separation or divorce but not share residence of the child equally.
Many states also began to incorporate the “friendly parent” idea into
their best interests determination. If a court had to choose between
parents, it should choose the one who is more likely to foster the other
parent’s continuing relationship with the child.

While joint custody is a promising improvement in many cases, recent
research has qualified that idea with a warning that joint custody and the
child’s continuing contact with both parents has to be balanced against
the need to shield the child from high levels of continuing parental
conflict that can result when unwilling and sometimes emotionally
unstable parents share responsibilities.

What does the “best interests standard” mean
today?
So, what does the “best interests of the child” mean today? Overt gender
bias has been eliminated, as have most mechanical formulations of the
test. In general terms, courts define the child’s best interests by listing
multiple factors that go into it, but without setting priorities among the
factors that it lists, leaving the final determination to judicial discretion.
The result is guided but individualized judicial decision making through
an evidentiary process that can cause great expense, anxiety, and
uncertainty.
The political and empirical battle over what is in the child’s best interests
continues. Courts continue to be accused of de facto gender bias by
father’s groups or mother’s groups. Because of the expense and
uncertainty of the litigation process, some advocate more predictability
in application of best interests standard by creating more presumptions
to confine judicial discretion. Some legislatures and courts are
experimenting with presumptions of joint legal (decision making) or
physical (50-50 timesharing) custody or the approximation rule
(parenting arrangements after separation and divorce should
“approximate” those that existed before).

The problem with all presumptions is that they
challenge the fundamental moral goal of the best
interests test — treating children and families as
individuals and unique beings.
The most promising shift in thinking to reconcile the competing values
involved in defining a child’s best interests is for public policy to
emphasize that parents should make that determination themselves
rather than rely on a judge. Parents are far more likely to adhere to
parenting arrangements they agree to voluntarily. Self-determination
typically reduces the expense and trauma of the child custody decisionmaking process significantly.
States can support parental self-determination by changing their legal
language from “custody” to “parenting” and by breaking down parental
functions (e.g., “decision making” and “residence”) instead of including
them in the single term “custody.” Instead of a custody order, parents
can create an individualized parenting plan without labeling one parent a
“winner” or “loser.” States have also begun to support the movement
toward parental self-determination through what Professor Jana Singer
has labeled a “velvet revolution” in resolving parenting disputes — away
from the courtroom toward meditation, parent education, and
collaborative law. The policy goal should be to have as many parents as
possible resolve their disputes themselves, reserving courtrooms for
protection of safety and legal rights rather than parenting arrangements.
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